[RFC] Granting voting power to locked HFT in NFT rewards

Proposal Details

Simple Overview

The proposal is to give all hashflow users equal voting power.

Specifically, voting power equal to the locked quantity would be allocated to NFT reward right holders.

Summary and Specifications

Currently, hashflow’s DAO is dominated by the voting power of a small number of Whale users, and proposals are often passed in their favor.

In particular, NFT compensation holders have been disadvantaged in the past by the extension of locks and the application of the 60-day rule.

This is the proposal to extend the lock period for NFT rewards.

This is the proposed 60-day rule

To have voting power in a hashflow DAO, the token must be locked to the hashvers and the HFT must be veHFT.
The following link shows the formula for voting power.


It is designed to take several years for all tokens of NFT rewards to be unlocked.

Below is a link regarding the unlocking of NFT rewards.

NFT reward holders have already been locked for over 6 months and have no voting power.

They are also not expected to be granted voting power in the future.

It is strange that locking in hashvers gives voting power, but locking in NFT rewards does not give voting power.

The current system of granting voting power is unequal and should be reviewed as follows

Amount of locked HFT= voting power.

For example, if there are 30,000 locked HFT, 30,000 voting power are granted.

Benefits (advantages):

Voting power would be more distributed than currently and DAO would be healthier.

Disadvantages (Cons)



Agree with the opinion to allocate the same amount of voting power to NFT Rewards warrant holders as the locked quantity.

NO if you disagree.


There are a few reasons why I disagree with this proposal, outlined below.

First off, the previous two proposals are presented out of context:

  • the first one (Snapshot) actually works in favor of the NFT holders, restituting tokens that had been cancelled via a previous proposal (Snapshot); that previous proposal was not a 1 whale-vs-rest proposal, there were votes coming at pretty much every size
  • the second one (Snapshot) was not targeted at NFT holders; it was also passed almost unanimously, with a vast majority of holders of all sizes being for it

Second off, staking HFT rewards is a choice that HFT holders have. The stake operates as a function of amount and time and represents the commitment they make to the protocol. These are tokens that could have been sold / kept / utilized in any other way, yet the holders decided to stake and use for governance.

Unvested rewards, on the other hand, are not yet owned by the users. They are due to be awarded on a schedule. Users did not choose to lock them, they just have not received them yet.

Moreover, the same NFT holders received very generous 30K HFT grants at TGE, totaling ~10M HFT. That amount of HFT represents more than the total current stake in the DAO. The majority simply decided not to hold, hence lowering their participation.

Lastly, the proposal is incomplete as there is no technical specification on how it should be implemented.

that previous proposal was not a 1 whale-vs-rest proposal, there were votes coming at pretty much every size

That is not true. For example, the No. on the last ballot was 113K veHFT. The breakdown shows that 95.5% (108K veHFT) of the votes were cast by only 2 users. In other words, 140 users voted in total, but the opinion of only 2 users could have changed the result.

This is a very dangerous situation for this DAO.

This proposal is expected to greatly improve this situation.
I support this proposal.


Unvested rewards, on the other hand, are not yet owned by the users. They are due to be awarded on a schedule. Users did not choose to lock them, they just have not received them yet.

The NFT holders are good users of the service. It is nonsense to deprive them of the opportunity to participate in this DAO.

I believe this is the reason why this DAO is not functioning actively.

This proposal will remedy this.

In a token based governance model, big holders can always tilt the balance, which is why the Guardians have been appointed – they mitigate potential hostile takeovers of the DAO.

In the veHFT model, big holders have to commit even more, as the time component comes into play. This makes it a way bigger commitment to be a “whale” in the new model. Nonetheless, there can be such accounts (e.g. people who stake large amounts for 2-3-4 years).

That doesn’t change the fact that unvested HFT is not the same as locked HFT. By the logic of this proposal, unvested team + investor tokens can also theoretically be used for voting – which I hope we agree is not a great idea.

Thanks for the comment Victor.

I have a question.

You claim that NFT rewards do not have voting power because they are not granted, but it was the team’s decision to grant only 30k HFT in the TGE in the first place.

It was not a decision by the DAO.

The team prepared NFT rewards as prizes for the open beta competition.

The team used NFTs as prizes in the Open Beta Competition to increase the volume of transactions in the competition.

How much did the competition participants waste on gas for the ETH mainnet?

The following links are reference data for the volume of transactions for each address in the open beta competition


Nevertheless, they took the liberty of changing the CLAIMABLE limit to 30,000 HFT before TGE.

It is true that the 30k NFT HFT was given in the TGE last November, but the hashvers should not have been functional at that time.

There was no option to stake HFT.

Early Access is this January.

I think it’s strange that we don’t get stake rewards, we don’t get voting power, and we are just locked in.

You say it’s technically difficult, but when the team expired the NFT rewards, team said DEV were just implementing what was decided in governance.

If it is technically difficult, I would change the proposal to unlock all NFT rewards immediately.

That way we can lock them in hashvers.

1 Like

Agree with 1.1. @gxmxni - this proposal is just about nft holders not about team tokens.


A few points:

  1. Looking at the dashboard that you provided, assuming all transactions were on Ethereum and gas cost per trade was high (let’s say $20 / trade), the max spent is $20K. In reality, most of the transactions were on alt-L1s / L2s, so I don’t expect anyone spent anywhere near that. When setting the 30K HFT TGE value, it was deemed to be an appropriate reward even for the users who were very active on the exchange and helped battle test it the most.

  2. Because there was no option to stake HFT, the DAO initially operated based on net HFT balance. Looking at the data, 30M HFT was awarded to NFT holders (a very large amount), with another 30M HFT unvested. If NFT holders kept 1/3 of their airdrop for governance, they would total about 10M HFT. As soon as staking became available, the DAO transitioned to veHFT. This rule was part of the genesis of the DAO.

  3. “Unvested” means that the tokens are due, but have NOT YET BEEN AWARDED. This would make it unfair for the people who were awarded tokens and decided to stake them. It would also be similar to the investor token allocation. One could argue “the investors funded the project, why can we not also give them voting power while they’re waiting for their tokens?”. All in all, this is the main reason I’m against this proposal.

  4. Vesting them immediately violates the sanctuary. The point of the sanctuary is to protect these tokens. Imagine proposing an immediate vest, losing that vote, and then having someone else propose taking them all away. We need to get past trying to change the allocation / distribution schedule of these tokens. I am also doubtful of the fact that the first thing people would do with unvested tokens is to stake them. :slight_smile:

  5. Technical difficulty is not an obstacle, but the current proposal does not suggest a technical way to do it, and I cannot think of an easy way off the top my head. Without solving this, this proposal cannot be upgraded to a Temp Check. One of the reasons we proposed upgrading the governance process was to ensure rigor in the proposal definition and eliminate confusion.

I agree.

NFT Rewards has been repeatedly revised since the original plan.
As a result, what a change it has been to the same distribution schedule as the teams and VCs.
HashDAO should put this proposal to a vote if they should call themselves a DAO and not a fake DAO where whales such as GSR have been the real decision makers.

A problem that has been neglected !NFTs have been traded in the market for a considerable period of time, which means that a significant portion of NFT holders did not acquire their NFTs through so-called “free” means but rather by purchasing them with real money based on the promise of NFT token rewards from the Hashflow team, at a cost of approximately $0.4-0.8 per HFT. However, these individuals have experienced rule changes from the team initially, followed by subsequent rule changes. The fair treatment of NFT holders in the secondary market seems to have been disregarded, as they have repeatedly been subjected to rule changes that have harmed their rights and interests. This is one of the reasons why many NFT holders have lost trust in the team and why the DAO has struggled to attract more participants. Instead of constantly complaining about holders abandoning the project, it is essential for the team to reflect on the actions they have taken that have harmed the interests of these token holders. I am merely expressing the emotions of those who have purchased NFTs. They have also acquired NFT reward tokens from the secondary market, but unlike current VE-HFT lockers, they were forced to lock their tokens without obtaining voting rights.

I support this proposal because NFT holders have gone through the following experiences:

  1. The team changed the rules from initially releasing all tokens during the TGE to releasing 30,000 tokens during the TGE and gradually releasing the rest over time.
  2. Due to the team’s rule changes, the allocation of NFT reward tokens was not properly assigned, resulting in early whales exerting control over the DAO and causing further harm to NFT holders by attempting to confiscate all reward tokens. As a result, NFT holders had no choice but to accept Victor’s proposal of a 4-year lockup period, similar to what the team suggested. This further harmed NFT holders.

Furthermore, everyone is talking about NFT holders selling their tokens, but they overlook the fact that many of the early NFT holders are no longer the original recipients of the team-awarded NFTs. Based on observation, many early NFT recipients have sold their tokens in the secondary market. During the TGE, many NFT holders believed in Hashflow and purchased NFT reward tokens with real money, costing approximately $0.4-0.8 per HFT, based on the team’s promise of releasing all tokens during the TGE. That is why after the rule changes, a significant number of tokens released during the TGE were sold by NFT holders, due to the lack of trust and the harm caused.

The conclusion of these statements is to request fair treatment for NFT holders. They have incurred significant costs in the secondary market but have not been granted the voting rights they should have. What is the difference between them and the current VE-HFT holders? Both obtained tokens from the secondary market, but VE-HFT holders voluntarily lock their tokens while NFT token lockers are forced to lock theirs for a period of 4 years.

Regardless, there is a loud outcry demanding fair voting rights. I also want to convey to Victor that he should reflect on why NFT holders are abandoning the tokens. The sole reason is the loss of trust caused by his actions and the continuous harm inflicted upon them.

As someone who have vested token + staked in Hashverse for maximum available time , in order for the OGs to be heard more loudly in the governance , I only in favor of the proposal with the conditions below:

  • the tokens will not be tradable
  • they will be staked in hashverse with no inflationary HFT rewards from hashverse allocation

Your idea is too extreme. I think it is safer to keep it separate from the hashverse.

A single statement that the tokens will become untradeable is not a sufficient explanation.
It seems as if the tokens will now be untradeable forever.
Do not take away tokens that have been restored from expire.
The subject should be able to choose whether to stake, choose the stake period, and be able to exchange for tradable HFT in the future.


How about the following?

  1. The NFT holder automatically increases his power level by 40% when staking HFT for a minimum of a month.

  2. Can be used in combination with The Creation’s Coffer NFT.

ex1) If both 1 and 2 above are met and 1000 HFT are staked in the hashverse for 12 months
1000HFT * (360/1440) * (1 + 0.4 + 0.1) = 375 veHFT

ex2) If only 1 above is met and 1000 HFT is staked in the hashverse for 12 months
1000HFT * (360/1440) * (1 + 0.4) = 350 veHFT

ex3) If only 2 above is met and 1000 HFT is staked in the hashverse for 12 months
1000HFT * (360/1440) * (1 + 0.1) = 275 veHFT

The effect lasts until all their NFT rewards are claimed.
This would have clear specifications and would not be difficult to implement.

This is also an attractive proposition and will help promote the use of HASHVERSE to OG members.


I agree to this proposal since the NFT holders should have their own right on HFT DAO too.

1 Like

I support on this. NFT holders should get voting power to HFT DAO too from their unvested token. All of NFT holders is OG and early users of Hashflow. DAO will be more healthier than usual.

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That’s a good, concrete idea. This would not be technically difficult.

I would like to proceed with this proposal to temperature check if possible?
@brian @gxmxni

A few clarifying questions:

  1. The proposal states that the veHFT power == amount of HFT locked. Does that mean that regardless of the amount locked (could be a month), the HFT will have voting power equating to a full 4 year stake? If so, that should be clearly articulated in the proposal, as the voters should be made aware.

  2. How would this be implemented on-chain? The current Snapshot-based voting requires on-chain presence of data that is keyed only by the wallet. Does this proposal still imply using Snapshot governance? If not, what does it use? If yes, how is the data pulled on-chain?

  3. If new smart contracts need to be implemented for the above, how will the audits get funded?

Note that all the information should be present in the proposal text, not the comments.